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Abstract: The involvement of the Prosperous Justice Party 
(PKS, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera) in the electoral democratic 
system in Indonesia raises a question whether it is possible 
for a political party with a deeply religious ideology to 
liberalize and entertain democracy. The decision to enter 
politics does not infrequently entail an abandonment of 
ideological purity. It represents an acceptance of the 
political order and power sharing-based politics. While 
identity and ideology are instrumental in political 
mobilization for PKS, it has no choice but to negotiate and 
interact with other political actors through coalitions and 
parliamentary politics. A modern party involved in a 
competitive and rule-based system, it is also required to 
broaden its electorate and reach out to non-Islamist voters. 
It is intriguing in this context to explore the party’s strategy 
to maintain its Islamist platforms and the base of support 
while allying itself with distinctly non-Islamist ruling elites, 
and engage in the pragmatic ruling coalition. Understanding 
the paradoxical roles of an Islamist party when involved in 
the on-going electoral democratic process, this paper also 
looks at the future of political Islam in Indonesia. 
Keywords: Islamism, PKS, Election, democracy. 
Introduction 
Indonesia’s political system has undergone transformations in 
recent years as a result of the opening of political opportunity in the 
post-Suharto era and the increasing adoption by the state of more or 
less democratic forms of government. In tandem with the spread of 
political party-based forms of political activity, a dozen political parties 
that represent different ideologies and interests have arisen, including 
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those explicitly espousing the application of the shari>‘ah (Islamic law) 
and other conservative positions. One such example is the Justice 
Party (PK, Partai Keadilan) whose emergence represents the growing 
strength of political Islam on the political landscape of Indonesia. This 
party is fundamentally different from the other Islamic parties—
United Development Party (PPP, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan), 
National Awakening Party (PKB, Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa), 
National Mandate Party (PAN, Partai Amanat Nasional) and Moon 
and Crescent Party (PBB, Partai Bulan Bintang)—in terms of its 
historical roots, its ideology, its political goals and the broader range of 
the electorate it appeals. In fact, it constitutes a permutation of the 
da’wah (Islamic proselytizing) movement exemplifying Islam as a total 
way of life, which began to gain ground on Indonesian university 
campuses in the 1970s.1 Widespread influence of this da’wah stream 
facilitated the efflorescence of the Muslim Brotherhood ideas and 
activism adopting the name tarbiyah (Islamic education), the Arabic 
word for education under a teacher who provides moral guidance.2 In 
the changing atmosphere of state-Islam relationship during the last 
decade of the New Order regime, marked by its accommodative stance 
towards Islam, the movement developed very fast to the extent that it 
emerged as a striking stream in the campus life of Indonesia during the 
1990s.3 
                                                                
1 This da’wah stream began to flourish across the Indonesian archipelago, from the 
Salman Mosque of the Bandung Institute of Technology that introduced the 
programme of the Latihan Mujahid Dakwah (Training of Da’wah Fighters) at the 
beginning of the 1970s. Having evolved into the network of the Lembaga Dakwah 
Kampus (Campus Da’wah Board), it provided the model for the dissemination of the 
usrah (family) system and da’wah activities and facilitated an increase in students’ 
observation of their Islamic obligations, in their wearing of the jilbab, and in the spread 
of Islamist books. 
2 On the tarbiyya movement, see Rifki Rosyad, A Quest for True Islam: A Study of the 
Islamic Resurgence Movement among Youth in Bandung, Indonesia (Canberra: ANU E Press, 
2006); Salman, “The Tarbiyah Movement: Why People Join This Indonesian 
Contemporary Islamic Movement,” Studia Islamika 13, 2 (2006): pp. 171-241; and on 
its transformation into PKS see Ali Said Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan Transformasi 
20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002); Mathias Diederich, “A 
Closer Look at Dakwah and Politics in Indonesia: The Partai Keadilan,” Archipel 64 
(2002): pp. 101–15; and Yon Machmudi, Islamising Indonesia: The Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah 
and the Prosperous Justice Party (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2008). 
3 Modelled after the cellular network of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the usrah 
developed by the tarbiyah movement provided Islamic training that emphasized the 
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As the party that evolved out of the movement that drew its 
inspiration from the Brotherhood, PK endeavoured to position Islam 
at the centre of the Indonesian political landscape and defined it 
primarily as a political ideology. It adapted a classical vision of Islam as 
a complete and universal system which comprehensively governs all 
spheres of social, political, economic and cultural life. Shari‘>ah is 
emphasized in this context as the only alternative system that leads 
Muslims to get rid of various current problems and catastrophes 
afflicting their lives as an impact of the implementation of secular 
systems. It is believed that on the basis of the shari‘ >ah, Muslims will be 
able to challenge the domination of the Western powers that have 
been collaborating with the Zionists to undermine Islam and the 
Muslim ummah.4 Implicit in this rhetoric is a protest against the existing 
nation-state system, deemed to be a weapon of the imperialist West to 
divide Muslim nations and demolish the khila>fah (caliphate). It is not 
surprising that PK was very much concerned with the issue of Islamic 
solidarity and re-establishment of the caliphate.5 There is thus a clear 
natural tension in the kind of political manifesto of PK between the 
ideal of the ummah and the reality of the nation-state. PK was in fact 
known as an avant-garde party of ikhwa>n and akhawa >t, popular terms 
used by tarbiyah members to address their fellow activists. Interestingly, 
by pushing the Islamist viewpoints and emphasizing its exclusiveness 
as an Islamist party, PK garnered only 1.4 per cent of the overall votes 
in the 1999 elections and thus failed to meet 2 per cent of the electoral 
threshold. 
The result of the 1999 elections forced PK to reconstitute as the 
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera) whose vision 
is nonetheless to strengthen the ideology, thought and system 
developed by its predecessor aspiring to apply Islam in the social, 
political and legal system of Indonesia.6 Yet, a different emphasis is put 
                                                                                                                                      
purity of God (tawh}i>d) and strict implementation of Islamic precepts. Particular Islamic 
doctrines, including da’wah, jiha>d, ghazw al-fikr and ja>hili>yah, were highlighted as a means 
for the movement to organize and train its following. 
4 Aay Muhammad Furkon, Partai Kedilan Sejahtera: Ideologi dan Praksis Politik Kaum Muda 
Muslim Indonesia Kontemporer (Jakarta: Teraju, 2004), pp. 149-157; M. Imdadun Rahmat, 
Ideologi Politik PKS, Dari Masjid Kampus ke Gedung Parlemen (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2008), pp. 
55-57.  
5 Furkon, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera; Rahmat, Ideologi Politik PKS, p. 58. 
6 Rahmat, Ideologi Politik PKS, p. 114. 
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on the aim of the party. Claiming to be a party of moral reform, it is 
aimed at educating the public through da’wah, about what a 
government based on the moral principles of Islam would look like, 
rather than obtaining political power. With the slogan “clean and 
caring”, the party launched popular campaigns focusing on the 
national issues of a feeble economy and rampant corruption.7 While 
actively involved in humanitarian operations in numerous disaster 
areas across the Indonesian archipelago, it simultaneously expressed 
concern about the world politics, by sending warning messages about 
the danger of U.S. foreign policy for the Muslim world. Within this 
context, it actively organized peaceful demonstrations against 
American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as well as Israeli attacks 
on Palestine. For PKS, U.S. tendency to side with Israel has served as 
the main catalyst for protracted conflicts in the Middle East. Solidarity 
for Palestine has become the main theme in the party’s discourses of 
foreign policy affairs. 
During the campaigns in the run-up to the parliamentary elections 
in April 2004, PKS reiterated its vision as a party of moral reform 
concerned with the fight against nation’s ultimate problems, including 
corruption, collusion and nepotism. It conveyed the image of a 
disciplined organization, unsoiled in dress and thinking, free of 
corruption and morally pure. This strategy worked well. The party won 
significant votes, as much as 7.34 per cent.8 More surprisingly, it 
scored a landslide victory in Jakarta, the Indonesian capital, capturing 
24 per cent of the vote. Support for the party came not only from the 
core constituency among the ikhwa>n and akhawa>t in the network of the 
tarbiyah movement and aspirant Islamists, but also from swing voters, 
including both urban (upper) middle class in elite neighbourhoods and 
poor migrants in slum areas. With 45 seats in parliament, PKS came to 
engage in the nationalist ruling coalition led by the Democratic Party’s 
founder, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who won the presidential 
                                                                
7 Elizabeth Fuller Collins, “Islam is the Solution, Dakwah and Democracy in Indo-
nesia”, Kultur, the Indonesian Journal for Muslim Cultures 3, 1 (2003): pp. 148–82; Elizabeth 
Fuller Collins and Ihsan Ali Fauzi, “Islam and Democracy, the Successful New Party 
PKS is a Moderate Alternative to Radical Islamism”, Inside Indonesia 81 (2005); and Ary 
Hermawan, “PKS dan Perubahan Paradigma Gerakan Islam”, Republika (10 April 
2004), p. 4. 
8 Francois Raillon, “Islam and Democracy: Indonesia’s 2004 Election and Beyond,” 
Paper presented at EIAS Special Briefing (Brussels: EIAS, 2004), p. 2. 
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elections in September 2004 with his running mate Jusuf Kalla from 
the Professional Party, Golkar.9 
This paper is aimed at examining the way PKS has negotiated its 
Islamist identity and ideology with power sharing-based pragmatic 
politics. Identity and ideology are certainly instrumental in political 
mobilization, and even more so for an Islamist party PKS. As a 
modern party involved in the electoral democratic system, however, it 
has no choice but to interact with other political actors through 
coalitions and parliamentary politics. It is also required to broaden its 
electorate and reach out to non-Islamist voters. It is intriguing in this 
context to explore the party’s strategy to maintain its Islamist 
platforms and the base of support while allying itself with distinctly 
non-Islamist ruling elites, and engage in the pragmatic ruling coalition. 
Understanding the paradoxical roles of an Islamist party when 
involved in the ongoing electoral democratic process, this paper also 
looks at the way in which young Islamists have sought to synthesize 
between Islamic revival and democracy. 
Negotiating Islam and Nation-State 
PK’s failure to win significant votes in the 1999 elections gave its 
successor a lesson that its electoral basis was not adequate to support 
the party’s expansion. It was confined to those active in the tarbiyah 
movement and sympathizers that had been spread along diverse 
professional and socio-economic status. In fact, the image as an 
exclusivist party of pious Muslims committed to Islam proved to be 
the first obstacle for PKS to reach out to non-Islamist voters. While 
nationalist political rivals remained hostile and suspicious to its 
potential hidden agenda of establishing an Islamic state, the party 
lacked broadly based-social networks and sufficient financial resources 
                                                                
9 The consultative assembly (Majlis Shura) of the party had agreed to support 
Yudhoyono’s bid for presidency on the basis of a five-point memorandum of 
understanding (MoU) signed by Hidayat Nur Wahid and Yudoyono himself. Both 
parties were committed to the endeavour to build a clean, caring and professional 
governance, demonstrated, among other things, by the readiness to fire corrupt cabinet 
members and determination not to abuse Muslims and Indonesian people in general. 
They were also committed to protect the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia 
amid the changing constellation of world politics and continue the process of 
democratization and reformation in the sake of the supremacy of civil society, coined 
as the ‘masyarakat madani’. In the last two stated points, both parties agreed to boost the 
nation’s morality and societal quality and welfare in respect of law enforcement as well 
as human rights, and to support the Palestinians’ struggle for independence. 
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to mobilize its political machine. Nor had it a certain association to 
established Muslim organizations, primarily represented by the 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. Members of the 
organizations have their own political channels through the parties set 
up or sponsored by their leaders—PKB, PAN, PPP and PBB. 
In an attempt to cope with some reservations shown by its secular 
nationalist rivals and Indonesian people in general, PKS sought to 
create a new image as a moderate Islamist party adopting the national 
and democratic rhetoric. Reflecting its commitment to the principle of 
a secular political order which becomes a prerequisite for the 
establishment of a liberal democracy,10 the party began to acknowledge 
the secular format of the Indonesian nation-state and state ideology 
the Pancasila, as well as the 1945 Indonesian Constitution as the 
framework of its political participation in the electoral democratic 
system. Despite the principle of God’s absolute sovereignty held by 
most Brotherhood theoreticians, PKS saw no contradiction between 
Islam and democracy. It argues that the community has the right to 
define political institutions via democracy, which is considered an 
instrument to infuse Islam into the Indonesian politics.11 Reference has 
been made to Yusuf Qaradawi, known as a moderate Brotherhood 
thinker, who acknowledges the notion that the people are entrusted 
with the right to govern themselves and this does not derogate from 
God’s ultimate sovereignty. This progressive position represents a 
more inclusive politics in the Muslim world where democracy has 
increasingly been perceived to incorporate the values that Islam 
advocates, including consultation, enjoining what is good and 
prohibiting evil, and resisting unbelief.12 
Despite the importance of Islam as a source of identity and 
legitimacy in PKS’s discourse, the party’s vision is tinted with national 
narratives. In its charter and articles of association, PKS insists that the 
aim of its establishment is to realize the national ideals as declared in 
the Indonesian Constitution for the sake of the burgeoning of civil 
                                                                
10 Ziya Öniş, “Globalisation and Party Transformation, Turkey’s Justice and 
Development Party in Perspective,” in Peter Burnell (ed.), Globalising Democracy 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2007).  
11 Interview with Cholid Mahmud, one of the PKS leading figures in Yogyakarta, 
March 2008. 
12 James Piscatori, “Islam, Islamists and the Electoral Principle in the Middle East,” 
ISIM Paper 1 (Leiden: ISIM, 2000). 
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society. The very existence of the Republic of Indonesia is emphasized 
as nation-state entity and territorial unity altogether that need to be 
protected and defended from any destruction by nation enemies. Its 
strategic goal is both to establish an independent, caring and 
prosperous civil society that respects justice and to realize the 
principles of honest, clean, transparent and responsible good 
governance.13 In what seems to be ambiguous terms, PKS also 
describes itself as a religious nationalist party, which rejects a secular, 
deceitful political practice. It claims to stand at the forefront to 
struggle for justice and prosperity within the unity of ummah and 
nation. Attempting to synthesize Islam and nationalism, the party 
believes that, if implemented correctly, Islam can serve as a solution to 
various economic, social and political problems currently facing 
Indonesia. There is certainly a democratic dilemma in PKS’s adoption 
of Islamist ideology and participation in democratic politics.14 But its 
political behaviour turned more pragmatic in tandem with the on-
going democratic consolidation.  
Borrowing the framework introduced by Baker when analysing the 
dynamics of political Islam in Egypt, it is intriguing to look at the 
extent to which the rise of PKS may represent the birth of new 
Islamists who hold out a longer-term vision for reform. As Baker 
argues, new Islamists’ adoption of a participatory and pragmatic 
approach distinguishes them significantly from the first generation of 
Islamists that sought political power to reform the social order along 
Islamic lines. They are more content to contest elections and take up 
whatever seats or offices they may win. Instead of cultivating a 
defensive discourse perceiving Islam as a religion under attack that 
requires its followers to defend and fight against enemies, they call 
Muslims to participate in the task to improve society.15 The character 
of their thinking might be summarized in terms of holism, inclusivity 
and dialogue. Religion is seen as just one part of the solution. It needs 
to be regarded in conjunction with national interests, economic 
realities and cultural traditions. Given their emphasis on national 
                                                                
13 See PKS’s articles of association, Article 3; see also the explanation of this article in 
the basic policy of the party. See http://www.pk-sejahtera.org.  
14 See Ahmad-Norma Permata, “Ideology, Institutions, Political Actions: Prosperous 
Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia,” Asien 19 (2008): pp. 22-36. 
15 R. Baker, Islam Without Fear: Egypt and the New Islamists (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2003). 
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interest, they are open not only to collaborate with other political 
forces and non-Muslims as equal partners, but also to dialogue and 
collective deliberation. No doubt, the new Islamists represent, as 
Mandaville has noted, “a broader generational and strategic shift 
identifiable in Muslim movements across several settings today”.16 
As a matter of fact, PKS has introduced a dramatic break with its 
rigid ideology around the concept of the totality in Islam (Islam ka>ffah) 
as developed in the tarbiyah movement. It believes that the Pancasila, as 
the state philosophical foundation, can function as the main inspiration 
for the whole process of statecraft and governance. Yet for PKS, the 
Pancasila should be taken not as the sole ideology that serves as the 
bastion of secularization blocking any other political aspirations. It 
suggests instead that the application of the Pancasila and democracy 
can work altogether with that of Islamic values and principles. Being 
aware that the issue of the Jakarta Charter (Piagam Jakarta) has long 
overshadowed the relationship between Islam and the state in 
Indonesia, PKS preferred not to prolong the debate on the seven 
words “dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat bagi pemeluknya” in the 
Charter, which stipulate the obligation for adherents of Islam to follow 
the shari‘>ah.17 In the atmosphere of reform that heralded a freedom of 
expression, Muslim politicians from a number of Islamic parties 
revived the debate in their endeavour to give the shari‘>ah a 
constitutional status. Like the attempts made by the first generation of 
Islamists, their endeavour also ended in failure.18 In an elegant 
manoeuvre, PKS came up with the idea to implement the Madinah 
Charter (Piagam Madinah), a constitution that essentially established 
the Madinah city-state under the leadership of the Prophet 
Muh}ammad.19 The Charter was the first written constitution in Islam 
                                                                
16 Peter Mandaville, Global Political Islam (London and New York: Routledge, 2007). 
17 Together with the other seven Islamic parties (PPP, PBB, Masyumi, PKU, PNU, 
PUI and PSII 1905), PKS signed a joint-declaration to call for a reinsertion of the 
seven words in the Jakarta Charter into the amended 1945 Indonesian Constitution 
during the people’s consultative assembly annual session in August 2002 at a meeting 
in Al-Azhar Mosque in Jakarta. See http://www.pk-sejahtera.org. 
18 Nadirsyah Hosen, “Religion and the Indonesian Constitution: A Recent Debate,” 
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies. 36, 3 (2005): pp. 419–40.  
19 PKS’s chairman, Tifatul Sembiring, reiterated his party denial of the importance of 
the Jakarta Charter in a seminar in London on Indonesian politics and economic 
progress. According to him, what PKS has endorsed is the application of the Madina 
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and arguably the first constitutional law in society. Before Prophet 
Muhammad’s arrival from Mecca, Yathrib (later known as Madinah) 
had a population of 10,000 that was organized into approximately 22 
tribes. Approximately half the population was Jewish and half was 
Arab. The introduction of the Charter established rules of government 
and addressed specific social issues of the community in an attempt to 
put to an end the chaos and conflict that had been plaguing the region 
for generations.20 By referring to the Charter, PKS demonstrates the 
compatibility of Islam with democracy and, at the same time, its 
determination to abide by civic principles of pluralism as well as 
peaceful coexistence among and within diverse religious groups. 
In response to continued suspicion of its political rivals about its 
hidden agenda to establish an Islamic state, PKS insists what is more 
important is not how Islam is institutionalized as a state system, but 
how its basic values, which include the tendency to realize a just and 
clean governance, are embedded in the political practices of the state 
and in the management of societal affairs. This is emphasized as the 
meaning of the party’s commitment to “build a better social and 
political life in accordance with Islamic values”.21 PKS does not deny 
the importance of the shari‘>ah. Convinced that Islam has spirited the 
Indonesian Constitution and all of its derivative legal products, PKS 
aspires to include the shari‘>ah in the Indonesian political system and 
practice. What Indonesia desperately needs is, according to the party’s 
founder Hidayat Nur Wahid, not the application of the shari‘>ah at the 
symbolic level, but rather at the substantial level as a moral 
endorsement within the framework of nation-state and democratic 
system. He believes that the shari‘ >ah can be implemented through the 
enforcement of justice rule and good governance that guarantee the 
fulfilment of civil rights.22 In PKS’s point of view, this is the most 
suitable and realistic strategy to prepare the societal awareness towards 
the comprehensive application of the shari‘>ah. 
                                                                                                                                      
Charter that in essence guarantees religious pluralism. See PKS, “Mengkaji Indonesia 
dari Inggris,” http://www.pk-sejahtera.org (20 June 2008). 
20 For a further account on the Madina Charter, see William Montgomery Watt, 
Muhammad at Medina (Oxford University Press, 1956); and Efraim Karsh, Islamic 
Imperialism: A History (Yale: Yale University Press, 2006). 
21 See “Kebijakan Dasar PKS”, in http://www.pk-sejahtera.org. 
22 Hidayat Nur Wahid, “Shari’ >a Should Stress Morals, Not Law,” The Jakarta Post (30 
August 2007). 
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Given its major emphasis on the supremacy of the shari‘>ah with 
regard to the importance of moral values and principles in politics, 
PKS has remained an intriguing puzzle for political scientists and 
observers as well as its political rivals. They are questioning PKS’s 
ability to be a national party that respects the principles of religious 
freedom as part of a broader agenda of individual rights and 
democratization.23 Continued debates over its ambivalence towards 
democracy notwithstanding, PKS has increasingly developed an 
inclusive political platform and altered its basic perception about what 
is permissible in a democratic environment. It has no doubt learnt how 
to be involved in the electoral democratic games and become a 
proactive force contributing to the process of further democratic 
deepening in Indonesia. The democratization itself necessarily involves 
a learning process. As we will see, PKS has no longer hesitated to 
progressively embrace liberal democratic norms in the process of 
trying to construct broad electoral coalitions within the boundary of 
parliamentary democracy. 
Electoral, Parliamentary and Cabinet Participation 
In an attempt to set up a party institution and organizational 
infrastructure, PKS first mobilized dedicated cadres that had joined 
small cell units called usrah, literally meaning family, in the tarbiyah 
movement. Most of them are educated members involved in 
cultivating a striking Islamic environment in their own social domains, 
such as family, professional organization and office. Yet, even groups 
that were relatively well-established adopted a new process of 
institutionalization, including registration with the appropriate 
government agency, the establishment of a formal office or 
headquarters, and efforts at increasing local presence through regional 
offices. The first action by PKS was to establish a formal structure 
within the party, including administrative divisions of the headquarters 
office, an executive committee and a consultative council, called shu>ra >. 
This model closely followed the internal structure of the Brotherhood 
in Jordan and Egypt. Benefiting from its predecessor’s institutional 
                                                                
23 For instance, Sadanand Dhume, “Radical March on Indonesia’s Future,” Far Eastern 
Economic Review 168, 5 (May 2005): pp. 11–19; “PKS and the Future of RI’s 
Democracy,” Jakarta Post (5 December 2005); and Zachary Abuza, “Politics and 
Violence in Indonesia: An Emerging Jihadist-Islamist Nexus?,” NBR Analysis 15, 3 
(September 2004): pp. 1–54. 
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structures, PKS’s executive boards immediately exist in 30 provinces, 
312 districts and municipalities, and 2,155 sub-districts across 
Indonesia, plus 13 representatives abroad called Information Centre of 
PKS (PIPKS). These branch offices served as the centre for 
recruitment and consolidation of the party’s cadres. 
The role of leadership in helping PKS to moderate its political 
platform and transform its image as a moderate Islamist party should 
not be overlooked. Hidayat Nur Wahid and M. Anis Matta, the 
chairman and secretary general of the party respectively, are two noted 
activists that began to take a leading role in the tarbiyah movement in 
the changing political atmosphere of the 1990s. They represent a new 
generation of Indonesian Islamists adopting a participatory and 
pragmatic approach in politics. Other important personalities in PKS’s 
leadership include former student activists involved in anti-Suharto 
mass movement in 1998. Among these cohorts are Zulkifliemansyah, 
Rama Pratama, Andi Rahmat and Fahry Hamzah himself, the leading 
figure in the tarbiyah-linked student organization, the Indonesian 
Muslim Student Action Union (KAMMI). Beyond these circles, PKS 
recruited academics, businessmen and professionals sympathetic to 
their goal of cleaning Indonesia’s political practices. The party’s 
leadership recruitment process therefore did not rely on traditional 
hegemonic political ties nor on status quo endorsements. It tried to do 
the best in order to put forth fresh leaders that were not offspring of 
the old elite. Seen from this perspective, the rise of PKS appears to be 
the best example of what can be accomplished in the kind of open 
democratic system Indonesia is establishing. It represents an end to the 
elitist monopoly by making the process more proletarian and 
transparent. 
The broad network of cadres and party’s structure reaching the 
village level helps PKS’s campaign to promote popular issues 
concerned with poverty, education and corruption. This campaign 
provided a new hope for many people discontented with the 
government led by Megawati Sukarnoputri of PDI-P, known as a 
nationalist-secular leader. Her effort to get rid of economic pressures 
by selling state properties and profitable companies provoked some 
criticism. Known as a president whose performance was not 
convincing and believed to be under the influence of her husband, 
Taufik Kiemas, in decision-making, she failed to convince the public 
that her government and her party were different or any better than 
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other political elites and parties.24 Together with the Democratic Party 
set up by Yudhoyono, PKS became the symbol of change for the 
Indonesian electorate that wanted new faces and a different way of 
conducting politics. The results of 45 parliament seats at the national, 
157 at the provincial and 900 at the district levels were the appropriate 
rewards for the working of PKS’s cadres and institutional network 
across Indonesia and its success to offer a new hope for the future of 
Indonesian politics. 
At the outset of its political participation in the state institution, 
PKS succeeded in bringing its chairman, Hidayat Nur Wahid, into a 
prestigious position as the speaker of the People Consultative 
Assembly (MPR, Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat). His candidacy was 
supported by medium-sized parties, including the Democratic Party, 
PAN and PPP, plus the group of regional representatives or senators 
(DPD, Dewan Perwakilan Daerah) in MPR. The rise of Nur Wahid to 
the position as the speaker of the assembly confirmed the move of 
PKS into a world of mainstream politics frequently marked by 
pragmatism and compromises. His first manoeuvre was to withdraw 
from his chairmanship at PKS and move to the advisory council of the 
party. Tifatul Sembiring, PKS’s vice-chairman for Sumatra, came as his 
replacement. This manoeuvre was believed not only instrumental for 
his attempt to demonstrate his commitment to stand above his own 
party’s interest and devote solely to nation’s agenda of reform and 
democratization, but was also important to show PKS’s determination 
to rely on party’s platforms and programmes, rather than certain 
charismatic personalities. 
Based on a similar argument, PKS leaders legitimized the party’s 
involvement in the ruling coalition. While they found themselves 
subject to the realities of day-to-day politics of Indonesia and 
institutional rules of democratic games, they have been convinced that 
participation in the cabinet coalition would add to their political 
learning experience especially in the art of governing. It is also believed 
as a means to conquer the fears some observers and other coalition 
partners have still put forward regarding the party’s potential threat to 
Indonesia’s democracy.25 PKS was given three cabinet portfolios, 
                                                                
24 Raillon, “Islam and Democracy,” p. 4. 
25 Zulkifliemansyah, “Overcoming the Fear: PKS and Democratization,” The Jakarta 
Post (12 December 2005). 
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including the ministries of agriculture, housing, and youth and sport. 
The party placed three leading cadres into these positions. They are 
Anton Apriantono, a Bogor Institute of Agriculture’s academic 
graduating from the University of Reading, England, as the minister of 
agriculture; Muhammad Yusuf Asy’ari, a former financial manager at 
the largest private national TV company, RCTI, as the minister of 
housing; and Adhyaksa Dault, a former leader of the Golkar-linked 
National Committee of Indonesian Youth (KNPI), as the minister of 
youth and sport. 
Despite their success to convince other political forces about their 
commitment to the nation, and thus overcoming the sense of being 
exclusive, PKS leadership has no political blueprint for social 
transformation and their understanding of governance is shaped by 
their flexible, if not pragmatic, standpoints. As a result, they seemed 
ambivalent towards a variety of crucial issues, including the increase of 
oil prices and cash transfer programmes initiated by Yudhoyono’s 
government. Only on certain divisive symbolic issues did they stand at 
the forefront to express their political standpoints. One such example 
is on the issue of pornography, Palestinian conflict and Ahmadiyah. 
PKS was persistent to call for a ratification of anti-pornography bill 
and solidarity to Palestinian people against Israeli attacks. They actively 
mobilized members to call for a disbanding of Ahmadiyah considered 
a deviant sect threatening Muslim faith. 
PKS’s image as a party with a reputation of being clean and polite 
faced the first real test when its young members involved in Realpolitik 
in parliament got closer to the levers of power. While PKS legislators, 
both at the national and local levels, were challenged to carry out their 
promises of being clean and at the vanguard of the total reform, the 
temptations of power and wealth have so far proved unprejudiced. 
Like members of other Islamic parties, they also have been implicated 
in widespread corruption scandals in parliament.26 As evidence, PKS’s 
legislators in Commission IV were forced to return gratification money 
as much as Rp 1.9 billion in relation to the uncovered scandal of the 
development of Bagan Siapi-api port in Sumatra. 
                                                                
26 Yet, if compared to legislators from other parties in parliament, including the Islamic 
ones, PKS members have relatively been clean. While a dozen legislators have been 
arrested by the Committe of Combatting Corruption (KPK, Komisi Pemberantasan 
Korupsi) for corruption scandals over the last five years, none of them was from PKS. 
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For the sake of fulfilling its political targets, PKS has appeared to 
be more pragmatic, especially in its endeavour to win various direct 
elections at regional levels (pilkada). It did not hesitate to help any 
candidates capable of paying by lending through the party institution 
and its broad mobilization network, and collaborate with other parties, 
including the nationalist-secular PDI-P and the religious Christian 
Prosperous Peaceful Party (PDS, Partai Damai Sejahtera). In this way, 
PKS claimed to have succeeded in promoting its members and 
sympathizers to the posts of governors and heads of district across 
Indonesia. PKS scored a prestigious victory in Depok, West Java, 
where its leading cadre and former minister of forestry in Abdurahman 
Wahid’s presidency, Nur Mahmudi Ismail, was elected as the city’s 
mayor. In another praiseworthy manoeuvre, PKS promoted former 
police high-ranking officer, Adang Daradjatun, to be the candidate of 
Jakarta’s governor with his runner mate, Dani Anwar. At that time, the 
party was quite confident of not collaborating with any other parties, 
which together promoted Fauzi Bowo as Jakarta’s hopeful governor 
with his running mate, Prijanto. Despite its failure to win the elections 
in the special region of Indonesia’s capital, PKS also participated in the 
2008 election race in West Java by promoting his own cadre, Ahmad 
Heryawan. In collaboration with the National Mandate Party 
promoting Dedi Yusuf as Heryawan’s hopeful running mate, PKS won 
the elections this time. This success preceded another victory by PKS 
in promoting Syamsul Arifin and his running mate, Gatot 
Pudjonugroho, to the post of governor and vice-governor of North 
Sumatra in the direct elections in the same year. 
Contrary to what may be assumed, PKS has never been on the 
forefront to call for the application of shari’>ah bylaws that loudly 
resonated in various regencies, including Solok in West Sumatra, 
Indramayu, Garut and Tasikmalaya in West Java; Banjarmasin and 
Banjar in South Kalimantan; and Maros and Bulukumba in South 
Sulawesi. The pioneers of the application of these regional regulations 
governing various aspects relating to the shari’>ah, such as dress code, 
Qur’anic literacy and the ban of opening stalls during fasting month 
Ramadan, have frequently been the political elites of Golkar and other 
secular parties. Manoeuvre of this sort has appeared to be an effective 
strategy to demonstrate their commitment to Islamic affairs.27 
                                                                
27 Robin Bush, “Regional Sharia Regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?” in 
Greg Fealy and Sally White (eds.), Expressing Islam, Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia 
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However, PKS never challenged such campaigns for the shari’>ah 
deemed by its elites as a constitutional way towards the comprehensive 
application of the shari’>ah. Again, one of its members insisted that the 
main concern of PKS was not with the application of such bylaws, but 
rather the attempt to conduct da’wah to diverse segments of 
Indonesians that eventually accept the supremacy of the shari’>ah as a 
total way of life.28 PKS’s reluctance to stand at the forefront to call for 
the application of the shari’>ah bylaws was clearly shaped by its sense of 
insecurity in the face of the state and the outside world, which remain 
suspicious to PKS’s hidden agenda to transform the secular format of 
Indonesia into a fully Islamic state. 
PKS’s political pragmatism provoked criticism from the party’s 
members and sympathizers. Debates have abounded in various blogs 
concerning the involvement of the so-called da’wah party PKS in 
electoral politics--whether da’wah commitment will influence politics or 
rather politics will steer the party away from da’wah.29 Fears have 
mounted whether the legislators representing PKS in the parliament 
remain consistent to be preachers (du’a>h) committed to Islamizing 
social sphere through political terrain or they are simply politicians 
pretending to be preachers. Some bloggers are even questioning the 
nature of the struggle for the supremacy of God’s teachings through 
an un-Islamic democratic game. PKS’s manoeuvre to collaborate with 
secular parties, if not the religious Christian party like PDS, appeared 
to be the most concerned that provoked the heated debates. In fact, 
more and more PKS members and sympathizers are worried that this 
short-term power-oriented political manoeuvre would steer the party’s 
struggle away from its main mission to improve the Indonesian 
political system and practice. They are of the opinion that this kind of 
coalition simply demonstrates the hypocrite characters of politicians 
and their ambition to power. 
Debates on PKS’s pragmatism reflect the common problem faced 
by an Islamist party when moving beyond the phase of a social 
movement to seek direct involvement in the political order. The choice 
                                                                                                                                      
(Singapore: ISEAS, 2008), pp. 174-91; Michael Buehler, “The Rise of Shari’ >a Bylaws in 
Indonesian Districts: An Indication for Changing Pattern of Power Accumulation and 
Political Corruption,” South East Asia Research 16, 2 (2008): pp. 255–285. 
28 Interview with Cholid Mahmud, Yogyakarta, March 2008. 
29 See, for instance, debates at http://www.pkswatch.blogspot.com. 
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to enter politics is fraught with problems, particularly since it requires 
compromise—in all senses of the word—of ideological beliefs, 
preferences, modus operandi and even goals. Being involved in the 
existing political system, an Islamist party is demanded to accept the 
political order as a legitimate venue to work with. Since power-sharing 
even with groups whose views are different seems to be a norm in 
politics, compromises in belief and ideology are inevitably to be made. 
Through entry into politics, an Islamist party implicitly recognizes that 
political priorities will often supersede the religious, that, and that daily 
decisions will require choices between Islam and the interests of the 
party. In other words, political participation in the existing system 
signals abandonment of abstract ideals and marks entry into the murky 
and dissatisfying world of compromises and partial goals.30 
Da’wah and Social Services 
It is interesting to note that PKS’s pragmatism has not necessarily 
moderated its image as a party that harbours a hidden agenda to 
establish an Islamic state. The main problem lies in its ambition to 
cultivate da’wah as a complementary strategy to dominate the political 
landscape of Indonesia. Within the framework of the tarbiyya 
movement, PKS has, in fact, continuously attempted to develop 
various da’wah activities, including h>alqa, dawra, pengajian (religious 
lectures), liqa>’ (meeting), rih>lah (tour), mabit (staying overnight), seminar 
and workshops. These activities are deemed necessary as a 
manifestation of the tarbiyah vision to build an Islamic society based on 
eight Brotherhood principles as laid down by Hasan al-Banna. These 
include (i) Da’wah Salafi>yah (to refuse any activity which are in contrary 
to the Qur’a>n and the Sunna); (ii) T {ari >qah Sunni>yah (emphasizing the 
necessity to practise the teachings of Muhammad); (iii) H {aqi>qah S{u>fi<yah 
(placing morality as an identity); (iv) Hay’ah Siya>si<yah (willing internal 
political and social changes); (v) Jama>’ah Riya>d}i<>yah (paying attention to 
the necessity of healthy living and sport); (vi) Ra>bit }at ‘Ilmi >yah Thaqafi>yah 
(effort to increase science and knowledge abilities); (vii) Shirkah 
Iqtis}a>di>ya (ensuring economic strength and fair distribution); and (viii) 
                                                                
30 Graham E. Fuller, The Future of Political Islam (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2003), 
pp. 133–4. 
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Fikrah Ijtima>’i>ya (committed to contributing to resolving social 
problems).31 
The main objectives of the PKS da’wah programme are to recruit 
party core members charged with the task to attract potential members 
and sympathizers into their circles, thus broadening the party’s core 
constituency, and to strengthen the solidarity and consolidation among 
the party members. PKS has deliberately targeted youth (including 
students at senior secondary schools and universities) in these outreach 
activities since it has a long-term socio-political vision based on the 
idea of instilling in the younger generation the idea that societal reform 
along religiously prescribed lines is an obligation that should be 
pursued through civic activism. Part of a long-term vision of 
Islamizing the Indonesian social sphere, PKS’s da’wah has also 
deliberately targeted household women, professionals and a broader 
audience through majlis ta’lim and religious gatherings. PKS’s emphasis 
on da’wah as a strategy to bring change represents the shift of the 
Islamist tactic towards the Islamization of the society from below. 
Believed to gradually bring about the Islamization of social sphere as a 
whole, this strategic shift has occurred, keeping pace with the process 
of democratic consolidation in Indonesia following the upsurge in 
Islamist militancy after Suharto.32 Da’wah is also considered more 
sustainable compared to a participation in the electoral democracy and 
governing coalition. Within the framework of da’wah, PKS has 
sponsored the efflorescence of various Islamic educational, charitable, 
economic, social and relief institutions—all providing a combination of 
basic services and religious empowerment. 
PKS’s da’wah has so far appeared to be the key for the party’s 
success to recruit disciplined and dedicated young cadres.33 The 
                                                                
31 See Fitron Nur Ikhsan, “The Prosperous and Justice Party: The New Genre of 
Islamic Political Party in Indonesia,” Unpublished MA Thesis (Singapore: RSIS Nanyang 
Technological University, 2008). For a further account on the Brotherhood strategy of 
movement, see Hasan al-Banna, Risalah Pergerakan 2 (Solo: Intermedia, 2001); see also 
Ali Abdul Halim Mahmud, Perangkat-Perangkat Tarbiyah Ikhwanul Muslimin, trans. Wahid 
Ahmadi et al. (Solo: Intermedia, 2004). 
32 Noorhaidi Hasan, “Shari’>a, Militancy and Democratic Consolidation in Indonesia,” 
Working Paper No. 143 (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 
2007). 
33 Critics have blamed PKS for developing a communist-type recruitment and 
cadrement system. One blogger even changed the meaning of PKS’s abbreviation 
from ‘Partai Keadilan Sejahtera’ (Prosperous Justice Party) to be ‘Partai Komunis 
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recruitment process takes place mainly through various religious 
programmes that PKS has organized on university campuses. Most 
students start their involvement in the da’wah activities of the tarbi>yah 
movement secretly (‘a>m sirri>yah) and are only allowed to demonstrate 
their participation when they are confident to do so (‘a>m jahri >yah). 
Indeed, university campuses have long become the target of the 
expansion of the tarbiyah movement and other transnational Islamist 
organizations. 
There are some circles in the structure of cadre recruitment on 
university campuses. The core circle designing the grand strategy to 
recruit members is called Majelis Shura (MS, Consultative Council) and 
it supervises the Majelis Besar (MB, General Council). This systematic 
recruitment process leads to PKS’s domination over the formal 
organizations among students, including the Student Executive Body 
(BEM, Badan Eksekutif Mahasiswa), the Student Representative Body 
(BPM, Badan Perwakilan Mahasiswa) and the Student Islamic Activism 
Unit (Rohis, Kerohanian Islam), operating from the department to 
university levels. Having controlled the formal student activism units, 
PKS is able to establish linkage with university elites, including boards 
of deans and rectors. This linkage forms the basis for PKS to mobilize 
students in response to various national and international issues.34 
PKS’s cadre recruitment system inside the university campuses is not 
much different from that of outside the campus domains. Normally, 
the system is centred on a respected personality such as a religious 
teacher and its expansion is equal to the extent to which the teacher 
succeeds in developing his influence along the line of his pengajian 
(religious lesson) networks. 
PKS has also sponsored the establishment of the Iqra Club, a 
da’wah wing among secondary students and teenagers. This group has 
become increasingly active in secondary schools and has helped to 
augment students’ da’wah activities in Islamic activity units. Activists 
are obsessed with their dream to bring back the victory of the ummah, 
the effort of which begins with the inculcation of Islamic values in 
                                                                                                                                      
Sejahtera’ (Prosperous Communist Party) and its symbol from rice and crescent to be 
rice and a grass knife. 
34 Interviews with PKS’s young cadres—Ahmad Pramono, Irfan Ahmadi, Muhammad 
Salahuddin—in Yogyakarta, 10-12 March 2008. Cf. testimony made by Arbania 
Fitriani posted in her Facebook note and widely spread via online networks. 
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individuals.35 Hence, the Iqra Club has endeavoured to package and 
disseminate Islamist messages through different modes of activism. In 
close collaboration with the Islamic Activism Unit (Rohis) at senior 
high schools, it has been active to organize liqa>’ (meeting), mabi>t 
(overnight), rih}>lah (travelling) and mukhayyam (camping), among other 
activities.36 As a result of these activities, Islamic nuances have 
achieved a prominence in senior high schools in Indonesia today. The 
majority of female students have adopted headscarves. 
While PKS’s political platform is moderate by the standards of 
most Islamist political movements, its da’wah programme has some 
authoritarian leanings, raising doubts in the public mind about how far 
it would respect a pluralistic political order. For instance, the main 
doctrine to which PKS cadres abide by is the Arabic maxim saying 
“nah>nu du‘a>h qabla kulli shay’” (we are preachers upon any other 
professions) and “sami‘na> wa at }>a‘na>” (we listen and we follow). This 
doctrine has tied cadres to be loyal, militant members of PKS. They 
will take for granted all instructions coming from instructors (murabbi >) 
prepared to indoctrinate their cadres to commit for the struggle for the 
glory of Islam. Within this context, it appears that PKS conceives of 
democracy in rather instrumental terms in their quest to change 
Indonesian society to a more Islamist direction. In addition to this, in 
the foreign policy affairs its approach involves a strong anti-Israeli 
discourse, as noted earlier. Meanwhile sympathy and support for 
Palestine society has been continuously cultivated to inflame the 
rhetoric of victimization as a result of the global Zionist-cum-Christian 
conspiracy to undermine Islam and the ummah. 
Related to its concern with da’wah activities, PKS has set up various 
centres for educating preachers prepared to help people at the 
grassroots level to enhance their insights into Islam. One such example 
is the al-Hikmah Islamic Education Institution that had been set up by 
tarbiyah activists at Mampang Pela, in southern part of Jakarta. Its 
objective is to produce da’wah cadres who are prepared to spearhead 
                                                                
35 For an overview on the da’wah activities of Iqra Club and similar groups, see Tim 
Riset and Pengembangan Da’wahh Yayasan Darussalam, Menuju Teladan Darussalam 
(Yogyakarta: Daarussalaam Press, 2002); Izzatul Jannah, Materi Tarbiyah untuk Remaja 
(Surakarta: Ziyad Visi Media, 2006); and Nugroho Widiyantoro, Panduan Dakwah 
Sekolah: Kerja Besar untuk Perubahan Besar (Bandung: Syaamil Cipta Media, 2007). 
36 Interviews with Muhammad Khairu Mumtaz and Hamdan Subhi, Yogyakarta, 
February 2008. 
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the da’wah activities among Muslims. A significant number of da’wah 
campus activists came to study Islam and Arabic at Al-Hikmah. Hence, 
it has quickly evolved into a centre for producing preachers and a 
mental training for da’wah activists. Its curriculum focuses on the 
teaching of the Qur’an, including memorizing, refining the ability to 
recite the Qur’an and understand its meanings (tah}fi>dh, tah}si>n and tafsi>r), 
as well as spiritual activities, such as midnight prayer and Qur’anic 
recitations.37 Al-Hikmah has provided a model for PKS to set up a task 
force charged with a special duty to supply mosques and mushalla with 
ready-to-use preachers. To invite the preachers, a mosque only needs 
to contact the hotline numbers available in widely distributed 
pamphlets and flattered banners. 
PKS has optimized the pioneering efforts made by the tarbiyah-
linked Khairu Ummah da’wah institution to expand its influence among 
urban (upper) middle class. This institution has incorporated a dozen 
noted preachers and religious teachers active to deliver lectures among 
various social organizations and professional associations across 
Indonesia. With the blueprint of the da’wah expansion provided by the 
al-Hikmah and Khairu Ummahh, PKS has accordingly expanded its 
influence and its electorate basis at diverse levels of societal 
organizations, including the established Muslim organizations, 
Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). 
Realizing the potential to create an Islamic sector through 
education, PKS has facilitated the proliferation of the Integrated 
Islamic Schools, offering an alternative quality education. The PKS-
linked Network of Integrated Islamic School (JSIT, Jaringan Sekolah 
Islam Terpadu) incorporates some 700 schools at all levels, from 
kindergarten to the secondary levels. JSIT evolved out of the study 
club popular among senior high school students who wanted to enrich 
their knowledge outside school times and better prepare for national 
exams. Called Nurul Fikri, it had been set up by tarbiyah activists. A 
significant number of Nurul Fikri study club graduates succeeded in 
continuing their studies at favourite universities across Indonesia, 
especially the University of Indonesia in Jakarta. JSIT has played a 
pivotal role in assisting da’wah activists and aspirant Islamists across 
Indonesia to develop their own schools through networking and 
information exchange. In this context, the network emerged as a sort 
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of franchise that offers anybody a licence to set up his own school. It 
simply provides a blueprint and guideline on how to establish the 
school. By joining JSIT, a school is administered under the auspice of 
the Ministry of National Education and allowed to utilize a solid 
curriculum constructed by JSIT. JSIT has regional and district 
branches across Indonesia. Every regional branch has one coordinator 
supervising district branch coordinators.38 
To strengthen its image as a party active in humanitarian and relief 
operations, PKS has set up humanitarian and social units, including the 
Justice Post for Caring the Ummah (Pos Keadilan Peduli Ummaht), the 
Indonesian Red Crescent (Bulan Tsabit Merah Indonesia) and the 
Justice Scout (Pandu Keadilan). Through these organizations, PKS has 
played a crucial role to provide medical services and medicines and 
collect donations to be distributed to disaster victims. PKS volunteers’ 
alertness to provide “emergency responses” was quite visible in the 
aftermath of the tsunami in Aceh in December 2004 as well as the 
earthquake in Yogyakarta and its surrounding in May 2006. They set 
up emergency operation centres, complete with party’s symbols and 
emblems. In one of its media advertisements, PKS is proud to be the 
most committed party to people suffering from the effects of disasters. 
It claimed to have launched hundreds of humanitarian and relief 
operations, spending about US$1 billion and US$0.2 billion for special 
operation to help Palestinian Muslims. Again, PKS has been criticized 
by various social organizations for its hidden agenda to extend its 
political influence under the banner of humanitarian and relief aids. 
PKS has likewise set up a fundraising-like institution called 
“Rumah Zakat” (Islamic alms house), through which it distributes 
free-interest loans.39 The Rumah Zakat has helped PKS cultivate civil 
society organizations operating widely to reach society at the grassroot 
level with the aim of providing consultancy services and advocacy for 
business incubation and worker associations. Through various 
channels, PKS has run various programmes of economic 
empowerment by giving soft-loans to more than 5,550 individuals and 
912 independent small enterprise groups, amounting to a circulation of 
about Rp 6,4 billion. 
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PKS’s strategy to recruit constituents and broaden its electoral 
bases may resemble AKP’s approach to win popular support in Turkey 
by providing service and performance, rather than ideology.40 Yet, 
PKS’s concoction of da’wah, politics and social services and its 
aggressive penetration into the established Muslim organizations, 
Muhammadiyah and NU, have provoked resistance. Muhammadiyah 
chairman Din Syamsuddin issued a letter circulated among members 
about the danger of PKS towards the very existence of their 
organization.41 Accordingly, Muhammadiyah leadership at all branch 
levels have been instructed to close PKS’s access to the organization’s 
mosques and schools.42 In fact, PKS’s penetration brought with it a 
different Salafi-style Islam and recruited a significant number of 
Muhammadiyah activists into its circle. This manoeuvre has shocked 
Muhammadiyah leadership. By recruiting Muhammadiyah activists, 
PKS has succeeded not only in what is called “whitening” 
Muhammadiyah, but also taking over some of the Muhammadiyah 
mosques and schools. As a consequence, fragmentation and conflict 
have been rife in the Muhammadiyah.43 Later, Muhammadiyah issued 
another letter insisting its autonomy and forbidding the utilization of 
Muhammadiyah facilities and its socio-educational institutions for the 
interest of any political parties.44 Similarly, Nahdlatul Ulama leadership 
decided to consolidate in order to protect their mosques and education 
institutions from being infiltrated by PKS. NU chairman Hasyim 
Muzadi repeatedly warned his members of PKS’s ideological threat 
against Nahdlatul Ulama’s principle of ahl al-sunnah wa al-jama’ah. PKS 
has been criticized for introducing neo-Wahhabism, among other 
                                                                
40 M. Hakan Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009). 
41 Marcus Mietzner, Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia, From Turbulent 
Transition to Democratic Consolidation (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009), pp. 239-40. 
42 Surat Keputusan PP Muhammadiyah Nomor 149 Kep/1.0/b/2006 tentang 
Kebijakan PP Muhammadiyah tentang Konsolidasi Organisasi dan Amal Usaha. 
43 Lukman Hakim Arifin and Mukhlison S. Widodo, “Mendapat Tawaran dari Sales 
Ideologi,” interview with Din Syamsuddin, Muhammadiyah Chairman, Gatra 8 (4 
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44 See Arif Nur Kholis, “PP Muh Terbitkan Sembilan Poin Instruksi Hadapi Pemilu 
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transnational ideologies considered to have shaken solidarity among 
NU people. 
The 2009 Parliamentary Elections 
PKS’s campaigns to strengthen its image as a moderate Islamist 
party open to all segments of Indonesian society (catch-all party) 
intensified in the run up towards the parliamentary elections in April 
2009. Although its pragmatic political standpoints have less emphasis 
on ideology, many voters still question whether PKS has abandoned its 
Islamist agenda and reconciled itself to operating within the framework 
of Indonesian nationalism, or whether the priority that the party had 
given to victory in electoral politics over a religious agenda merely 
represents a tactical shift in its political strategy. This sort of scepticism 
resonated loudly with some reservations and challenges posed by the 
established Muslim organizations, as noted earlier. Within this context, 
PKS aired a series of media advertisements. One such example is that 
titled “the party for all of us”, in which PKS displayed a series of 
comments made by different people from diverse backgrounds, from 
an old garbage collector to a beautiful girl wearing T-shirt and jeans 
(without headscarf). Through these campaigns, the party sought to 
demonstrate its siding with a moderate version of Islam compatible 
with democracy. The party’s elites, including the chairman of the 
consultative body Hilmy Aminuddin, repeatedly refuted their affinity 
with Wahhabism and denied their animosity towards traditional 
religious practices, such as tahlilan, yasinan and mawludan. They also 
affirmed their theological affiliation with the mainstream Indonesian 
Islam, the ahl al-sunnah wa al-jama’ah.45 
In the recent legislative elections held on 9 April 2009, PKS won 
about 8 per cent of the overall votes, putting it at the top four after 
Yudhoyono’s Democratic Party and the other two secular nationalist 
parties, Golkar and PDI-P, winning 20.45, 14.85 and 14.65 per cent 
respectively. Having expanded its electoral bases and launched massive 
media campaigns, PKS seemed disappointed with this result as its 
target was to win no less than 15 per cent of the vote. It is interesting 
                                                                
45 See the statement made by Hilmy Muhammad in a seminar in London as reported 
by http://www.pk-sejahtera.com, “Ketua Majelis Syuro: Saya Sering Memimpin Tahlil 
dan Yasin” (22 July 2008); see also “PKS Menjawab Fitnah” (25 October 2008). See 
also a sort of self-critique article by a PKS cadre Yon Machmudi, “PKS Mengancam 
Eksistensi Ormas Islam?” spread in various blog-spots. 
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in the rest of this paper to discuss why PKS has failed to double its 
vote although it had run various strategies to create the image as a 
catch-all party concerned with the interests of the poor, youth, middle 
class and other segments of the Indonesian society. 
Bearing in mind that the PKS’s success to win 7.4 per cent of the 
votes in the 2004 legislative elections was contributed significantly by 
swing voters discontented with PDI-P founder Megawati’s 
performance, the insignificant increase of the vote in the recent 
election has apparently to do with its failure to attract swing voters. As 
noted earlier, the rise of PKS in 2002 gave some hope among various 
segments of the Indonesian society refusing to support pragmatic 
politicians and political parties concerned solely with parliament seats 
and power sharing in the government. This hope has hardly 
materialized in tandem with PKS’s increasingly pragmatic politics and 
its electoral, parliamentary and cabinet participation over the last five 
years. Accordingly, support of swing voters apparently no longer went 
to PKS, but rather to the Democratic Party in the recent elections. 
Under the party-led governing coalition, more and more people are 
enjoying political stability and economic recovery. 
In fact, Indonesia’s economic performance has improved. Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) growth rose to 6.3 per cent, according to the 
International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook Database in 
April 2008. Foreign direct investment reached a record US$10.3 billion 
in 2007, up from US$6 billion in the previous year. As indicated by 
LSI’s survey released in January 2009, these achievements contributed 
to the increase in society’s satisfaction index to Yudhoyono’s 
performance, being 62.5 per cent in dealing with economy and 63 per 
cent in dealing with corruption. The number is still higher in his 
dealing with education and health, which is 75 per cent. The 
Democratic Party even succeeded to create an image as the cleanest 
party with 11 per cent support of the respondents, compared to 9 per 
cent support for PKS.46 
PKS’s failure to compete with the Democratic Party to win the 
hearts of the people can also be seen as a risk of an Islamist party 
which participates in the ruling coalition and yet involves in ideological 
and tactical compromises. As noted before, the image of the 
Indonesian parliament has been tarnished by corruption scandals 
                                                                
46 See LSI, “Swing Voter: Kecenderungan Menjelang Pemilu 2009,” 
http://www.lsi.or.id. 
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involving parliamentarians from Islamic parties, including PKS, and 
this has spread scepticism. Voter saw this kind of pragmatism as a 
form of hypocrisy and inconsistency to stand on the original platform 
of the party. They have increasingly perceived that there is no 
difference between secular and Islamic parties in their practices, 
especially when dealing with power, the government’s project bids and 
money. 
Apart from that, PKS has never dominated the control over 
religious symbols and interpretations, whose meanings are 
continuously debated by various religious actors involved in 
competition over who speaks for Islam. Its ideological and tactical 
compromises have instead reduced its identification with the symbols. 
This situation is not ideal for PKS especially when secular parties 
increasingly realized the importance of religious symbols to attract 
more voters. PDI-P, for instance, sought to develop its linkage with 
Muslim voters by setting up Baitul Muslimin Indonesia (the house of 
Indonesian Muslims). It is a party wing committed to Islamic 
education and training and helping the Indonesian Democratic Party 
of Struggle (PDI-P) members wanting to go on h}ajj to Mecca 
(pilgrimage). The Democratic Party developed a similar institution 
when Yudhoyono established Light of Peace Dhikr Council (Majelis 
Zikir SBY Nurussalam). Yudhoyono is the chairman of the advisory 
council of the organization and his own son, Edy Baskoro, acts as his 
secretary. Several influential personalities and businessmen around 
him, including Kurdi Mustafa, Hartanto Eddie Wibowo and Aziz 
Mochdar, serve as members of the organization’s advisory council.47 
The SBY dhikr council has been active to organize dhikr akbar, 
literally meaning the collective remembrance of God. It constitutes a 
devotional act in Islam that includes the chanting of divine names, 
supplications and aphorisms from sections of the Qur’an or from 
H {adi>th (Prophetic traditions) literature, which is performed 
collectively. Prayer beads upon a string, known as tasbi>h}, and 99 in 
number, corresponding to the 99 names of God, are frequently used to 
keep track of the number of recitations that make up the dhikr. Dhikr 
akbar normally begins with a series of speeches delivered by high-
                                                                
47 See Ruslan Andy Chandra, “Yayasan Majelis Dzikir SBY ‘Nurussalam’ Publikasikan 
Buku,” KabarIndonesia, posted on 21 August 2007; see also Rusdi Mathari, “Cahaya 
Keselamatan SBY,” Blog Article, posted on 21 April 2008 http://rusdimathari.word-
press.com/2008/04/21/cahaya-keselamatan-sby/. 
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ranking officials, who themselves are engaged in the programme by 
sitting on the floor next to the ustadh (teacher) leading the participants 
to chant verses from the Qur’an. The role of SBY’s dhikr council in the 
victory of the Democratic Party cannot be neglected since it is the 
medium through which the party’s cadres strengthen their solidarity 
and emphasize their concern with Islam. But, being identical to the 
Sufi ritual, dhikr akbar expresses more esoteric dimension of Islam than 
the political one. This kind of ritual primarily functions to nurture and 
express the political stability of stratified societies upon which the 
legitimacy of the system and its power holders depend.48 
Nevertheless, PKS’s performance in the elections is the best 
among Islamic parties. PAN, PKB and PPP lost between 20 and 70 
per cent of their votes as garnered in the 2004 legislative elections, 
while PBR and PBB failed to pass the 2.5 per cent of electoral 
threshold. PKS apparently could remedy its loss of swing voters by 
effectively mobilizing support from new voters especially among the 
young cadres that had been engaged in da’wah activism. As 
participation in the da’wah also shaped the political consciousness of a 
younger generation of Muslims and a much broader circle, thereby 
creating a constituency upon which Islamist candidates could draw, 
PKS still has some hope to improve its performance in the next 2014 
elections. PKS apparently believes that da’wah among youth is like 
planting seeds on a farm. 
Conclusion 
This paper has demonstrated that as an Islamist party that drew its 
inspiration from the Brotherhood-inspired tarbiyah movement, PKS 
has developed two paradoxical strategies whose final aim is to establish 
its political dominance on the landscape of the Indonesian public 
sphere. On one hand, it has participated in the electoral politics and 
launched popular campaigns in order for it to expand its electorate and 
the base of support and, thus, winning significant votes in the 
elections. Conveying alternative political visions to a wider audience, it 
has been active in promoting clean governance, anti-corruption and 
professionalism, deemed to be the prerequisite to get rid of the grasp 
of corruption, incompetent bureaucracy, poverty and other 
fundamental problems faced by Indonesia as a nation. Its ability to 
                                                                
48 David Kertzer, Ritual, Politics, and Power (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1988). 
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package these issues was the key to PKS’s success to garner significant 
votes in the 2004 parliamentary elections, capturing 7.34 per cent of 
the overall votes. To realize its ambition to triple this result in the 2009 
parliamentary elections, PKS has continued to expand its electorate 
and the base of support by maximizing its all-political machine and 
participating in pragmatic political compromises. Through various 
media campaigns, PKS has also strengthened its image as a catch-all 
party open for all segments of Indonesian society. 
No doubt, PKS’s entering the electoral politics and its participation 
in power-sharing in parliament and government has forced it to 
compromise in its abstract ideals, ideology and even tactical matters. 
Despite the importance of the shari’>ah as a source of identity and 
legitimacy in PKS’s discourse, the party’s politics has not been an 
instrument to impose the implementation of the shari’>ah at the formal 
level. It is concerned more with the attempt to implement it through 
the enforcement of justice rule and good governance that can 
guarantee the fulfilment of civil rights. PKS has created an image as a 
moderate Islamist party focusing on the national agenda of realizing 
the nation’s ideals for the sake of the burgeoning of civil society. 
Despite its ambivalence towards democracy, PKS has also increasingly 
developed an inclusive political platform and altered its basic 
perception about what is permissible in a democratic environment. It 
has no doubt learnt how to involve in the electoral democratic games 
and become a proactive force contributing to the process of further 
democratic deepening in Indonesia. Seen from this perspective, the rise 
of PKS in the Indonesian electoral system may represent the birth of 
new Islamists who hold out a longer-term vision for reform. 
Nevertheless, PKS’s pragmatism has not necessarily moderated its 
image as a party that harbours a hidden agenda to establish an Islamic 
state. The main problem lies in its ambition to cultivate da’wah as a 
complementary strategy to dominate the political landscape of 
Indonesia. PKS has deliberately targeted youth in these outreach 
activities since it has a long-term socio-political vision based on the 
idea of instilling in the younger generation the idea that societal reform 
along religiously prescribed lines is an obligation that should be 
pursued through civic activism. Yet, PKS’s manipulation of da’wah and 
social services for politics and its aggressive penetration into the 
established Muslim organizations, Muhammadiyah and NU, have 
provoked resistance. Related to the dynamics of competition over who 
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speaks for Islam, one remarkable nature of Muslim politics, this 
resistance signals the complexity of an Islamist force to dominate the 
political landscape of Indonesia.[] 
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